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Pricing of Illicit Drugs on Darknet Markets: A Conceptual Exploration 
 
 
Abstract 
Introduction: Trading illicit drugs on cryptomarkets differs in many ways from material retail markets. 
We aim to contribute to existing studies on pricing by studying the relationship between price changes 
in relation to changes in nominal value of the cryptocurrency. To this we qualitatively study product 
descriptions and images to expand the knowledge on price formation.  
Methods: We analysed 15 samples based on visual and textual scrapes from two major drug markets 
– for Dream Market between Januar 2014 and July 2015 and for Tochka between Januar 2015 and July 
2015. This longitudinal study relates changes in process to variations in the Bitcoin exchange rate and 
selling strategies. The analysis of the marketing of drugs online also addressed the development of the 
vendor profile and product offers. 
Results: Product prices change in relation to variations in the Bitcoin exchange rate. This points to the 
application of mechanisms for automatic price adaptations on the market level.  Real prices of the drug 
offers constantly increase. We assert that there is a bidirectional relationship. Vendors structure price 
and discounts to encourage feedback. And feedback in combination with signals of commitment and 
authenticity inform pricing. Product descriptions are an important feature in the successful 
marketization of goods, whereas product images are predominantly employed as an aspect of 
recognisability and feature of the vendor’s identity. 
Conclusion: Findings suggest that there is great potential for further qualitative research into the 
relationship between the online and offline identity of drug vendors as well as price setting when 
entering the market and subsequent changes for offered products. They also suggest that further 
investigation into the constitution and management of vendor’s identity on the cryptomarkets would 
allow a better understanding of vendors and their interactions on cryptomarkets. 
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Pricing of Illicit Drugs on Darknet Markets: A Conceptual and Qualitative 
Exploration 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper investigates  the dynamics of drug pricing on a sample of cryptomarkets markets. 
We approach pricing as one part of a total product offer which also includes what are in theory 
quantifiable claims about purity and drug quality, and qualitative image and brand building aspects 
such as the images and language used about the drug and the vendor. Cryptomarkets are anonymous 
online platforms for the sale of largely illicit goods and services. They use the darknet, the set of 
hardware and software systems designed to allow for anonymous browsing and hosting using the 
internet, combined with cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin (BTC) which allow for decentralised payment. 
Cryptomarkets are unique in that they can provide a more complete record of drug supply than any 
other method, allowing for detailed time-series analysis and analysis by product, volume and retail 
package (Barratt & Aldridge, 2016, Décary-Hétu et al 2016). In fact, the amount of information 
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provided to customers appears to nourish loyalty amongst the vendors’ customer base which 
translates to repeat buying (Décary-Hétu and Quessy-Doré, 2017). Research has estimated the value 
of drugs for sale on the cryptomarkets, the balance between bulk and retail sales  and the emerging 
role of cryptomarkets in mediating offline drug sales as well as their potential to change consumption 
patterns ((Aldridge & Décary-Hétu, 2016; Aldridge & Décary-Hétu, 2014;  Demant, Munksgaard and 
Houborg, 2018; Griffiths and Mounteney, 2017).  
What we need is a focus on pricing dynamics as both pragmatic decision making in response 
to dynamics in other parts of the market infrastructure such as the ever-gyrating Bitcoin exchange rate, 
and strategic decision making by vendors.  Pricing in drug markets typically behaves differently to that 
of the licit retail market. Pricing in offline drug markets is usually given in rounded, highly stepped 
currency amounts (£20, £50, £80 rather than for example £19.99, £24.99, £35.99). This is due to the 
need to transact rapidly and predictably and also clearly distinguish between one’s customer 
groupings. It performs a social sorting function. Likewise, we treat pricing data as illuminating a set of 
social and technical relationships, rather than being a straightforward reflection of buyer desire and 
supply capacity. 
We argue that ‘the price signal’ is not a simple reflection of market forces but is made up of 
multiple decisions and system effects by vendors, Bitcoin traders, market administrators, buyers, and 
law enforcement.  Some quantitative and qualitative explorations skillfully ventured into the the 
characterization of drug vendors on cryptomarkets – bringing much insight but did not touch 
specifically on pricing (Dolliver & Kenney, 2016; van Hout & Bingham, 2014; Tzanetakis, 2018). 
Important factors for the formation of drug prices in cryptomarkets are outlined by Aldridge, Stevens 
and Barratt (2017), often in juxtaposition with offline drug markets. Apart from commissions charged 
by the cryptomarkets and additional costs for stealth packaging, risk for example posed by law 
enforcement operations, (reduced) harm is commonly designated as a major factor in the pricing of 
illicit drugs (Aldridge and Askew, 2017; Décary-Hétu et al 2016; Barratt, Ferris and Winstock, 2016). 
Also the role of purity of drugs in relation to online and offline drug prices has been fruitfully explored 
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(van der Gouwe et al 2017). However, we also know that purity is part of a more complex embodied 
experience on the consumer side (Bancroft and Reid, 2016). An experience which often informs – or 
materializes in – consumers’ feedback to vendors and the rating. And particularly because vendors 
operate in a kind of anonymous environment, their survival in the market dos not only rely on a 
competitive price and quality but also on rating and feedback they receive from customers (Hardy and 
Nordgaard, 2016; Przepiorka et al, 2017). Soska and Christin point out that two factors affecting prices 
are ‘standard free market pressure’ and the vendor’s strategy ‘to halt sales of an item with the 
expectation of selling it again in the future’ so that ‘instead of de-listing the item and losing all of the 
reviews and ratings that have accumulated over time, the vendor instead raises the price to something 
prohibitively high in order to discourage any sales‘ (Soska & Christin, 2015). This pricing strategy is 
known as ‘holding price’ (ibid.). Crucially, drug prices reflect both market dynamics and the position of 
the drug vendor in relation to their client base and the risks of illicit trade. Therefore, price is an 
institutional construct as well as an indicator of supply and demand. It helps us to view illicit markets 
as performed and productive. They support or make possible various social and economic 
arrangements. 
Cunliff et al (2017) find that in within the Australian online drug market prices are comparable 
to the ones of drugs being sold offline, on the street. However, prices in on the Australian market are 
in general significantly higher than in other countries. Analysing this phenomenon in relation to (the 
perception of) risk, Cunliff et al trace this back to ‘risk tariffs’ that the stringent border inspection 
entails (2017: 71).Risk as part of the pricing of drugs on cryptomarkets plays out its institutional 
character. Other forms of risk on cryptomarkets such as exit-scams, rip-offs and arrests have been 
insightfully explored by existing research (Soska and Christin, 2015). Another source of risk that 
thwarts assumptions about illicit are law enforcement such as ‘Operation Onymous’ and ‘Operation 
Hyperion’ targeted  many European countries (Mazerolle, Soole, & Rombouts, 2006; Afilipoaie and 
Shortis, 2015). In a study on the effect of Operation Onymous on major cryptomarkets, Décary-Hétu 
and Giommoni (2017) reveal that the crackdown appeared to have no effect on the prices of the drugs 
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on sale. The authors surmise that it could have to do with an unchanged perception of risk, the inability 
to exploit the situation of diminished competition to raise prices or expand control over the market, 
the commitment to retain customers’ loyalty, or change in the shipped product on the side of the 
vendors. They also showed that in the long-run sale of drugs on cryptomarkets recovered fairly well. 
  
Risk of drug trade on cryptomarkets is also lowered by ever advancing technological features 
and invitation-only market membership allow market administrators to increase security measures. 
The acquisition of technical skills to enhance safe interactions on darknet markets are essential for 
lowering the risk to fall prey to law enforcement interventions and other scams (Kruithof et al, 2016).  
 
 
 
 
 Online markets for illicit drugs involve skilled, connected individuals. The bigger online illicit 
drug markets get, the more competitive they become. This puts increasing emphasis on the retention 
of customer loyalty through sharp pricing, good sales/distribution technique and supply of information 
related to the product and shipping.  
We were interested in whether product descriptions and images changed and if changes could 
be related to the change in price. The changes in the product description which aim to signal quality 
of product and trustworthiness of vendor lie within our purview, too. Besides involvement of law 
enforcement and stringency of border inspections which vendors cannot actively affect, product 
quality and trust are the core factors of risk for drug-dealing transactions (Taylor & Potter, 2013; 
Cunliffe et al, 2017). Such risk can be incorporated in the sales price. The visualisation of the product 
affects trustworthiness of the vendor and product quality, too. But beyond that it enhances 
(immediate) recognisability of vendor and product for the potential sellers. This demands skills that 
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are not used in the street drug market. Since it aims to positively affect sales and, thus, possibly also 
the price of the good, we also trace the visual presentation of 15 different offers of drugs from the 
most present vendors and relate them to the changes in price.  
Therefore, three questions guided this research:  
(1) How do prices adapt to changes in cryptocurrency?  
(2) How  the vendorsdeploy the visualisation of products and seller identity?  
(3) Do product descriptions change as result of a change in price? 
 
Methods 
We selected 15 cases of different drug offers by vendors most present on the markets, observing them 
between January 2014 and July 2015. The longitudinal study was based upon Gwern Branwen’s vast 
collection of publicly available scrapes of cryptomarkets which other cryptomarket research has drawn 
upon too1(Branwen, 2016; Ladegaard 2020; Rhumorbarbe et al, 2016). The scrapes, which are static 
copies of onion-pages taken with the help of a web-crawler software, comprise all onion-pages – that 
includes sub-pages – of the active cryptomarkets and contain graphic as well as textual content. From 
the available markets we chose two samples according to the criteria of longevity, security features 
(multisig, escrow, etc.), up-time2, and a clear focus on sales of drugs rather than other products. 
Weapons and hitman services were a criterion for exclusion. In Gwern’s overview of the drugnet 
markets there’s a row which indicates the markets where weapons and hitman services are not 
allowed. In addition, we intended to have one market which was opened before and one during the 
period captured by the scrapes – and Operation Onymous. The result was the choice of Dream Market 
and Tochka.Following Soska and Christin, another criterion for selecting Dream Market and Tochka 
was the completeness, frequency, instantaneousness, and soundness of the date in order to attain a 
coherent picture of happenings on the cryptomarkets (2015: 4).  For Dream Market scrapes were 
                                                 
1 An independent researcher. 
2 Verified on www.dnstats.net 
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available since January 2014 and for Tochka since February 2015. For both markets scrapes had been 
produced on an irregular but neat pattern which varies between one and eight days, but on average 
circulates around three days. This generated a total of 194,160 files in 980 folders for Dream Market 
and 8,349 files in 4,045 folders for Tochka. In 2017 Décary-Hétu and Giommoni point out some 
limitations regarding the quality of the dataset. The tool used by Gwern Branwen did not collect all 
listings, customer feedback and dealer profiles every time it was run. Following Décary-Hétu and 
Giommoni way of significantly reducing the unreliability of the dataset we revisited the dataset, and 
checked the validity of our sampling on the basis of an aggregate perspective. Thereby we looked into 
each week’s container of scrapes to check if the vendors that we selected according to the highest 
number of occurrences – based on the scrapes - on the respective markets. Also through our 
longitudinal approach by observing vendors and product listings over a longer period, we further 
reduce the distortion of our results based on the deficits in the dataset. Finally, at the time of research 
the data-et by Gwern Branwen was the best and only one available to researches. We ensured that 
the selected samples are amongst the ones with the most sustained presence – based on the scrapes 
- on Dream Market and Tochka, respectively. 
Dream Market, opened in November 2013, provides escrow function and captcha login. 
Escrow allows the market administrator to resolve disputes between buyer and seller. Captcha 
prevents machine logins and protects the market against cyber-attack. In January 2014 Dream Market 
started to gain sufficient awareness in the darknet market community to attract an increasing number 
of vendors for the exchange of different sorts of drugs, comprising psychedelics, amphetamines, 
ketamine and cannabis products. Tochka, on the other hand, went online in January 2015 (Branwen, 
2016), which allowed us to additionally follow the technical development and population of the market 
from the beginning. Whereas the design, visual appearance and web-site structure of Dream Market 
was already relatively refined, Tochka seemed to keep functionality much simpler.  
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Since this study meant going through files individually, the most meaningful strategy was 
starting with taking a sample from every month. Where possible we kept a regular time interval 
between the samples in order to ensure consistency in sampling. We usually used the first collection 
of scrapes each month. Whenever collections for a specific day were visibly incomplete we chose the 
nearest day with larger collection of scrapes. Only where the number of scrapes was significantly lower 
than the trend of the growing market would have suggested, it was possible to identify such 
incompleteness.  
Following the identification of the samples, we started categorising relevant data from Tochka 
and Dream Market. For this we identified the following categories:  
(1) The overview page of the market, discussion threads and forums implemented in the markets that 
address updates of the market features:  Observing how the security features, visualisation of product 
offers, structure of product categories, functionalities such as search or bitcoin exchange rate feed, 
and visualisation of the market platform develop allowed us to control for influences on pricing 
through developments of the market itself.  
(2) Product Description: From the product description  we derive information about the quality, 
quantity, price and shipping of the product. 
(3) Product Images: We analysed the product images in order to verify how vendors present their offers 
visually, how the visual product placement evolves and if it relates to the pricing. 
(4) Vendor Description: We considered the vendor description to control for the influence the 
information the vendors presents about themselves has on the price development of the product. 
Vendor descriptions regularly include information to signal product quality and trustworthiness of the 
vendor. 
Once categorised we created a time-chart for vendors who sell drugs in the categories 
Cannabis and Psychedelics. In this time-chart we recorded the appearance of all vendors of a given 
market in the sampled months. This allowed us to keep track of the general movement of the vending 
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market population. It provided an overview firstly, about the duration vendors remain on the market, 
secondly, about influx, leaving and recurring sellers.  
Within the completed time-chart we focused on the cannabis and psychedelics since those 
product groups are the most traded on both markets –also amongst the top selling products and 
together with MDMA and stimulants (Soska and Christin, 2015: 1). We distinguished between vendors 
selling only cannabis (C) or psychedelics (P) and the ones selling both (CP). For the new Tochka market 
we identified three vendors – two in the category of cannabis and one in psychedelic - selling goods 
for more than one month and, thus, qualified for longitudinal comparison. In Dream Market the 
situation for choosing was different. Since 175 vendors appeared more than once on the market, we 
introduced a threshold of a minimum of 10 occurrences. This reduced the number of vendors to four 
with three CP vendors and one C vendor. From them we chose the products that were offered for the 
longest. Thereby, we discerned a total of 15 cases; three psychedelics and six cannabis in Dream 
Market as well as four psychedelics and two cannabis in Tochka. 
We quantitatively and qualitatively analyised these 15 cases. Firstly, we calculated the changes 
in prices and juxtaposed them with change in BTC over the observed period. Hereby, we also 
considered the fluctuation in the number of vendors on each market. Secondly, further qualitative 
analysis helped us to examine possible visual and textual factors which might relate to a change in 
price. For this we examined the product descriptions and product photos from the monthly scrapes 
for each of the 15 cases. 
 
Results 
 
One of the prerequisites for a successful market are reasonably predictable prices for buyer and seller. 
It would not do to buy a product on a shopping website and find the price had changed between 
putting it in your basket and getting to the checkout, or afterwards. However, this is a problem faced 
by users of cryptomarkets due to the unpredictable fluctuations in currency values. The cryptomarket 
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infrastructure is designed to cope with this challenge through automatic pricing mechanisms. On the 
Darknet Market nominal product prices change constantly.  BTC has a highly volatile exchange rate 
with fiat currencies like the dollar, euro and pound sterling. Experiencing a general decrease in value 
since the closure of Silk Road 1, BTC continued to lose overall value before becoming more stagnant in 
the period between January 2014 and July 2015. Yet, the currency was still volatile with possible 
changes around $10 (per Bitcoin) in 24 hourswhich does not translate into a significant change in the 
price of a product (Coindesk 2016) This idiosyncratic feature needs to be accounted for when exploring 
pricing strategies and elicits the examination of the adaptability of nominal prices to changes of the 
value of BTC. Juxtaposing prices and the BTC exchange rate for each sampled case, followed by 
calculating the changes  of both, showed that prices respond to changes in the exchange rate. Increases 
in the value of BTC led in most cases to a decrease of the product price and vice versa. This relationship 
concurs with basic microeconomic principles on nominal product prices. The few exceptions, which 
could be traced back to special strategies such as discounts or the use of holding price. 
This process of adaptation is usually not a manual task for each vendor. In order to understand 
how this is done we shall briefly and in a simplified form outline the mechanism. Usually, the 
administrator of a market writes a small programme – “script” – which connects the prices of products 
to the BTC exchange rate. The market is basically an onion site (the visual “platform”) which is 
connected to a database, for example SQL. This database stores mainly all product offers and vendor 
profiles. The product offers include the price. The scripts allow the communication between the visual 
surface (the website) and the information that lies on the database. Such scripts are managed by the 
administrator and aim at the improvement of visual, structural and security features. This also 
encompasses the process for the automatic adjustment of prices. Hereby the script connects the price 
information stored on the database – and displayed on the website – with the BTC exchange rate. 
Consequently, variations in the exchange rate trigger a change in the price of the products. Our findings 
support this feature. The price of different products and different sellers respond to changes in the 
BTC exchange rate with only minimal variations across different products and sellers of one market. 
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Although prices changed mostly in a logical direction, i.e. to compensate for the change in the 
BTC exchange rate, they never counterbalanced it perfectly. Interestingly, most changes led to an 
increase in the real price of the product. Hereby we distinguished between responses to decreases in 
the BTC exchange rate on the one hand, and increases on the other. We identified much more cases 
of a decreasing BTC exchange rate. This conforms to the overall decrease of the BTC during that period. 
This which might have permitted a more nuanced mean. The responses in Tochka affirm this trend.. 
We encountered only once exception of a twofold increase e in price. The vendor, however, took the 
product off the market three days later and, therefore, leads us to assume that it was the application 
of a holding price (Soska and Christin, 2015). Other things being equal, the bottom line is a 
predominantly continuous increase in the real price of the product. This may indicate a general 
increase in demand, given that in the period of observation the number of vendors was generally 
increasing on both markets. Thus, the vendors might see an increasing customer base and repeat 
buyers thanks to nurturing loyalty through the substantive information they provide in their offers 
(Décary-Hétu and Quessy-Doré, 2017).  
T An increasing number of vendors selling their products within the same category – cannabis 
and / or psychedelics – suggesting increasing competition. By tracing the fluctuation, vendors for both 
markets displayed no clear pattern in the beginning months but consolidated to a more stable increase 
towards the end. The total number of drug products for both markets fluctuated in a vaguely similar 
pattern as the number of vendors. This weak relationship could be based on a simultaneous expansion 
or reduction of the offered product range of individual vendors. However, important to note here is 
that neither volatility of the amount of offered products nor of the number of vendors of psychedelics 
and cannabis seem to affect the constantly increasing real price. The alternative explanation would lie 
in a demand increasing in a way as to reflect the constant increase in price. Yet, this seem very unlikely 
because, as Soska and Christin (2015) demonstrate, demand also underlies a volatility which is affected 
for instance by changing situation of risk, such as major LE operations aimed at cryptomarkets. 
Subsequentlye turned our analysis to the relationship there is between vendor and buyer, and 
the vendor’s position in the markets. In order to explore how this relationship is signalled, we 
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investigated the product photos product descriptions, and vendor descriptions as well as 
enhancements and visible updates of the market. We shall emphasise at this point again that we were 
most concerned with changes in those factors which would enable an explanation of the change in real 
prices. 
For selling their products, vendors in business-to-consumer e-commerce are interested in 
consumer acceptance of the markets resulting in an increase of demand and potential for trust-
conferring feedback. Since this has the potential to affect changes in price it is important to consider 
when examining pricing patterns. There are two main perspectives for this: the technological-
perspective focusing on potential of technological advancement to attract consumers and the 
consumer-focused perspective which addresses in its core customers’ beliefs and experience through 
the eyes of a customer (Chen et al, 2002). Particularly for cryptomarkets, the attractiveness of the 
market ensured through technological features does not only facilitate transparency of the product 
quality and shipping but especially anonymity and security plays a crucial role. 
With this in mind we looked at the visible updates of the market. However, over the period of 
observation Dream Market made seemed to have been working on security issues. Some updates 
which aimed to integrate visual element were made at a later point which lies outside the determined 
time frame. For product photos, there is a tendency of using random images from the internet that 
represent the nature of the product. However, within the categories of cannabis and psychedelics 
there are some products with visual quality features more adequate to display then for others. LSD 
and NBome, for instance, are much less displayed as the form they are delivered (liquid, blotter, etc.) 
than Magic Mushrooms and DMT. For products that did not avail themselves for visualisation images 
from the internet were used representing more the “spirit” of the drug rather its nature. For example, 
one vendor used as product photo a very colourful adaptation of a portrait photo of Albert Hofmann, 
a popular pioneer on the scientific research of psychedelic substances. The reason for not taking one’s 
own photos is to minimalise traceability for Law Enforcement and, thus, to increase vendor´s 
anonymity outside the Dark Net Market. The use of personal photos suggests that a vendor might 
reckon that the benefits for sales – or at least the expectations for enhancing the sales volume – 
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outweighs this additional risk they take by using personal photos. Using one’s own photos tends to 
signify authenticity and a greater commitment to the market by the vendor. In fact, there is a 
discernible trend to create some product branding by visually embedding the vendor’s name in the 
product photos. The additional personalisation of a product image by editing it aims at enhancing the 
recognition of the vendor’s product offers. But precisely for the value of recognition further changes 
happen rarely. Over the period of observation for all 15 cases the product image remained unchanged.  
Also the product description offers fundamental information for buyer. It is the textual means 
for the vendors to signal quality of product and shipping. Besides shipping conditions some vendors 
offer compensation for intercepted packages which could be understood as a form of warranty. In case 
of dissatisfaction many vendors appeal in the product description to get in touch first before giving 
feedback. Thereby, they seek to bilaterally settle the query first. Direct indications about the quality of 
the product can look like the following about a cannabis product on Dream Market: ‘Organic 
greenhouse BC Bud, winner of the 1st High Life Cup in Barcelona […]’. This addresses the origin of the 
product and wider reputable acknowledgement as two crucial factors indicating high quality (Décary-
Hétu and Quessy-Doré, 2017; von der Gouwe et al 2017). In the period of observation, none of the 
product descriptions of the 15 cases did show alterations.  
A crucial quality signifier is feedback vendor receive from buyers based on the bought product 
(Bancroft & Scott Reid, 2016; Dellarocas, 2000). This encompasses the entire experience of the 
exchange – from shipping, support to  consumption. Feedback on quality, as Bancroft and Scott Reid 
illustrate, is intimately intertwined with reliability and predictability which positively affects harm 
reduction and trust (Bancroft & Scott Reid, 2016). This affects sales and consequently may inform 
pricing. Unlike the product description the amount of feedback does not stagnate in any of our cases. 
However, feedback increases irregularly. We found that for some products no feedback is added over 
several months, while others receive additional feedback more continuously. Whilst prices rise 
nonetheless, a clear causal relationship between the variations in the real prices of the products and 
feedback is not identifiable. We assert that there is a bidirectional relationship. Vendors structure price 
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and discounts to encourage feedback. And feedback in combination with signals of commitment and 
authenticity inform pricing.  
 
Discussion 
We approach pricing of illicit drugs in the cryptomarkets as a skilled, socially located activity. 
It does not simply reflect a balance between supply and demand.  
Looking closely into price behavior for 15 different drugs over several months, our research 
shows that drug prices on cryptomarkets do not change merely because of variations in supply, 
demand or competition. Thus, we join existing research with the aim to uncover and explore the social 
and institutional complexities of the drug price. For instance, a change in price could be explained by 
an announcement of a special temporary discount used to augment the sales volume for a specific 
product. The use of such a pricing strategy can usually be traced through a corresponding amendment 
of the product description for the specific product. Alterations in the value of BTC trigger price 
adaptation. This is not addressed at the individual vendor level but rather at the market level. By use 
of technical knowhow that administrators deploy functions for automatic price adaptation which aims 
at lowering the risk of selling product above or below value. This ties into debates on just prices 
(Elegido, 2015). Lowering this risk of unjust prices can prove fruitful for the consumers’ positive 
attitude, and thus acceptance, towards the market (Chen et al., 2002). Furthermore, the fact that this 
is addressed on the market level reveals a sense of common interests shared amongst a broad variety 
of market participants which is taken up and implemented by a central authority.  
We demonstrated that prices do not only counterbalance variations in the value of the 
cryptocurrency but constantly increase. Analysing this phenomenon we aimed to show that, beyond 
common marketing strategies such as discounts or special offers, not only a complex set of factors 
such as risk, trust and anonymity needs to be considered for pricing on cryptomarkets. Also the agency 
of the vendors and the direction they want to take the business in, where price works as a signal of a 
developing relationship between vendor and buyer, plays a significant role here.  
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This scrutiny of prices allowed us to reveal a more nuanced conceptualization of anonymity 
for vendors. Rather than being unknown, there is a persistence of online identity which is separate 
from the real world identity. The relationship of anonymity sits between vendor profile on the dark 
net and the human being behind. Between these knots, we argue that the need for anonymity is 
predominantly unidirectional, namely from the seller profile as virtual existence towards the seller as 
human being. This is to say that the profile, the means of encrypted communication, and the usage of 
cryptocurrencies for payment protects the identity of the human beings (Martin, 2014). Following the 
other direction, vendors to create and elaborate their virtual identity. The person behind the profile 
seeks to establish an identity on the market which allows him/her to raise awareness and enhance 
recognisability of his offered products. We content that in combination with feedback, product 
descriptionrating this identity is central to conveying trustworthiness, reliability and quality in an 
otherwise anonymous and competitive market environment (Bancroft, 2020). All factors that may 
positively nourish loyal customer-relationships (Décary-Hétu and Quessy-Doré, 2017). This identity 
presents a valuable asset for a successful market participation and adds a significant factor to consider 
when investigating pricing and the potential for harm reduction. 
 
Conclusion 
Pricing is a function of economic considerations but also transcends them. Particularly for the trade of 
illicit drugs on cryptomarkets, the scrutiny of prices contributes to a more substantial understanding 
of the market ecosystem and how vendors deal with risk, trust and anonymity. We contend that our 
findings nurture a better grasp of the boundaries of cryptomarkets, the organisation of supply, and the 
‘normalization or everyday nature of low-level supply behaviors’ (Chatwin & Potter, 2014). 
Furthermore, studies on price elasticity in illicit drug markets can throw up counter-intuitive findings 
such as consumption increasing with price for some users who are also dealers (Caulkins and Reuter 
2006). From Moeller and Sandberg (2018) we learn a lot about drug dealer’s perspectives and decisions 
on pricing in the street-market. Based on our findings we suggest to take a similar approach for 
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cryptomarket drug dealers whereby in-depth interviews would then allow to gain further insights into 
pricing on online drug markets. Thereby we could improve our understanding of the social and cultural 
complexity of the pricing of illicit drugs in online markets.  
Word count: 5,871 
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